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Speculative investments have always been a component of the marketplace. Their 
existence is vital for providing liquidity and risk transfer, allowing for an efficiently operating 
market. The futures market was originally used by farmers and grain buyers to reduce risk. There 
has been an observable increase of noncommercial (speculative) investment since the inception 
of the futures market. There is a belief that these investors may be adversely affecting the 
market, considering their primary view of the market is as a financial instrument with no actual 
interest in the physical underlying commodity. Agencies such as the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission have even gone as far as proposing position limits in an attempt to control 
speculation. This paper attempts to find if there is any significant evidence that speculation may 
be causing adverse effects to commodities and their related prices. With a better understanding 
of the market and market participants, agencies may be able to make informed decisions related 
to speculative policies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Commodity markets have served an important purpose for all involved in agricultural 
business for as long as agriculture has been around. The earliest forms of these markets can be 
traced back as far as 4000 B.C., where Sumerians developed clay tokens to establish a date and 
time for the delivery of animals (Banerjee 2013). This can be thought of as the earliest form of a 
futures contract. Through time the commodity market has evolved and expanded. The market 
exchange first became relevant in the United States by 1864, where commodities such as corn, 
wheat, pigs, and cattle were traded. This was all possible due to the advent of the Chicago Board 
of Trade, the world’s first established futures and options exchange. This exchange has expanded 
and ultimately merged with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to form the CME Group. This 
exchange now trades over 50 different contracts and has seen volumes of contracts up to 454 
million being traded (www.cftc.gov). This type of market structure has become a necessary 
component for the commodity sector. This is due to the nature of commodities and the time 
associated with their production. It can weeks up to years for a commodity to go from production 
to marketplace. This can be attributed to production, refinement, transportation, etc. One 
problem associated with the lagged period of delivering final goods to market is the adverse 
price risk. Commodity markets allow producers, end-users, or any participant in between to lock 
in a price through the process of hedging. This practice has been carried out for hundreds of 
years by the above mentioned. By definition, for every contract made by producers, end-users, or 
others involved in the handling of the actual physical commodity, there must also be a counter-
party. This is where speculation and other investment agencies emerge.  
The objective of this paper is to determine whether these noncommercial traders may be 
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adversely affecting the market. More specifically, the goal is to determine if these traders have 
any ability to dictate price movement in an ultimate attempt to profit. It should be clear that if 
this is in fact true it can be very problematic for the market and those who are involved for 
commercial reasons.  
This paper will use time series data and econometric models in an attempt to quantify the 
impact of the proposed hypothesis. The data consists of prices of commodities and the net 
positions held by speculative investors. The main point of this research is to test the effects that 
speculators (explanatory variable) have on prices (response). Additionally, prices (explanatory) 
will also be tested to see if they have any effect on speculative positions (response). Granger 
causality will be used to test this hypothesis. This test will be utilized due to its usefulness in 
determining whether one time series can significantly predict another time series.   
The results of this study will provide benefit to those who are involved in the policy 
making decisions regarding speculation. There have been proposed position limits for traders 
who have been characterized as speculators. These limits may have problematic effects on the 
marketplace, as described above. For position limits to be fairly enforced, there needs to be 
significant evidence of disruption caused by these speculative traders. This paper may also be 
beneficial to those who are searching for a better understanding of the intricacies of the 
commodity marketplace, or new investors in general.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 The period of 2007-2008 was met with major price swings in both energy and 
agricultural commodities. This period has a dramatic effect on the global economy and caused 
hardship for consumers. Both food and energy prices were increasing at an alarming rate and 
were unsustainable for the average consumer. Because of this, many sought out to find a causal 
link as to what was causing these rapid price movements. Speculation by financial investors was 
one of the proposed causes of this period of rapid price movements. This hypothesis has since 
been examined and tested by many individuals and has been met with mixed conclusions. Some 
believe that speculation has indeed played a part in the movement of prices, while others have 
concluded that speculation can in no way be used to explain this volatile period.  
 Michael Masters was one of the first to point at speculation as a causal effect of price 
movement. He testified before the United States Senate in an attempt to bring light to the 
situation, and ultimately did this in hopes that an increased awareness of the situation would 
bring about legislative policy action. His argument was that supply for commodities was 
adequate in compensating demand, but prices were still rising. This meant that, although prices 
were observed to be doubling and tripling, demand must have been increasing. His answer to an 
increased demand despite rapid price upswing was simple. He pointed towards a new group of 
participants in the commodity market that had not been previously present. This group of 
institutional investors, which he referred to as “index speculators”, was comprised of Corporate 
and Government Pension Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds, University Endowments and other 
Institutional Investors. Previously, this class of investors had a small relative amount of market 
participation, roughly $13 billion in 2003. By March of 2008, the same group of “index 
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speculators” had increased its investment in commodities up to $260 billion. Masters argued and 
concluded that this increase in investment during the same period where prices were wildly 
rising was not just a case of mere coincidence, but that this increased investment was itself the 
cause for the rise (Masters 2008). 
 Sanders and Irwin set out to test this claim made by Masters. They conducted their tests 
using time series data of commodity prices (response variable) and net positions (causal variable) 
held by index traders. They ran multiple tests to determine whether the positions held by index 
traders had any effect on the prices of commodities. They first tested to see if there was any 
statistical return to increased net positions. It should be noted that index investors routinely take 
long only investments and either hold or roll their contract when it comes time. With this in 
mind, the test would have to show an increase in futures price. Their findings showed that net 
index positions did not lead to any statistical market returns. They also set out to test whether 
increased investment by index funds was leading to an increase in volatility, another claim 
hypothesized about speculative investing. The test results showed that increased investment by 
index investors actually lowered volatility in commodity prices in subsequent weeks. These 
results readily contradict the assumption that speculative investment raises volatility. Sanders 
and Irwin concluded that speculative investment by index fund investors caused no significant 
disruption to the marketplace. Their implication was that any of the proposed restrictions to limit 
speculation would be more harmful than good, specifying that speculative investors play an 
important role in adding liquidity and risk absorption to the market (Sanders and Irwin 2011). 
 Others like Einloth (2009) came to find that speculative investment behaviors did have 
some measurable impact on the marketplace. He ran tests based off of marginal convenience 
yield, which can be derived from the commodity price. Convenience yield refers to the benefit of 
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holding physical goods, as opposed to holding the underlying contract. For a consumable 
commodity with non-trivial storage cost, such as oil, the marginal convenience yield should be 
inversely related to the quantity stored. He states that both quantity stored and demand have 
influences on price. For commodities that have are highly elastic in storage, speculation has the 
potential to have a large impact on prices. A producer would be willing to hold inventory now if 
prices were expected to be higher in the future. To demonstrate inversely, commodities that 
cannot practically be stored have no room for speculation and storage to impact price. This is 
because suppliers must take the role of a price taker, due to the nature of the commodity. Einloth 
also finds that high demand inelasticity allows for speculation to have an impact on prices. Based 
on his studies he found that speculation was attributed to some of the rapid price upswing, but 
was not the sole culprit. He concluded that most of the price movement was based on the fact of 
supply and demand factors, and that the marginal convenience yield caused producers to stagnate 
supply in an attempt to gain profit in the future. His belief was that speculation did not cause 
prices of oil to rise to $100/barrel, but that speculation was a present factor when prices rose to 
$141/barrel. This may have been due to the fact that producers were speculating on futures prices 
and adding to inventory, thus raising prices. The subsequent collapse, he argued, was from a 
decline in demand due to a drop in the global economy, not speculators unloading their positions. 
The successive price recovery in 2009 was from a responsed reduction in supply. Einloth showed 
that producers were accumulating speculative stores in response to marginal convenience yield. 
These results show speculation playing a part in price movement, but show that other factors 
were present.  
 Gilbert (2009) also conducted studies in an attempt to find if commodities prices 
experienced bubble like behavior that resulted in their movement away from fundamental prices. 
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He hypothesized that fundamental factors alone, such as Chinese growth (metals and energy 
commodities) and biofuels demand (agricultural foods), could not be the only explanation for 
price movement. The belief was that other market factors could have amplified or distorted 
commodity price movements. Specifically, trend-following speculation and index-based 
investment were assessed to determine if they did in fact play a factor. Gilbert used econometric 
procedures to test if these certain investment strategies employed by groups such as CTA’s 
(Commodity Trade Advisors), combined with short-term reporting horizons, for those such as 
hedge funds, has the potential to generate explosive behavior in the market. His studies found 
that this situation indeed created speculative bubbles, most notably in the copper market. His 
results also point towards bubble behavior in the soybean market. Nickel and crude oil market 
results may have experienced bubble like behavior and are open to interpretation. The only 
markets in the study which definitively experienced no bubble behavior were corn, wheat, and 
aluminum. Looking deeper into the results, Gilbert was able to identify that index-based 
investments were the main driver of bubble-like increases of non-ferrous metal and energy 
prices, with a smaller impact on agricultural prices. His estimated impact from index-based 
investment was 3-10 per cent in the period of 2006-2007, but observed a rise to 20-25 per cent 
by the first half of 2008. He went further in his study to create a “Corazzolla index”, which is 
simply an aggregate measure of all index positions held in the market. He used this index to 
granger test the effects of index positions against prices, and vice versa. Through the 
development of this Corazzolla index he was able to find that index investment accounted for 
roughly over a third of positions in the market during the observed period. His results show that 
the Corazzolla index can be used to explain changes in energy, non-ferrous metals, and 
agricultural futures prices. His conclusions based on his estimates are that index-based 
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investments were not the sole driver of explosive price changes during the period, but that they 
played a measurable role in amplifying price movements.  
 Krugman (2008) offers a more simple explanation to the phenomena. He, along with 
others previously mentioned, argues that prices cannot be influenced by speculation. He states 
that there are only two things that can be done with oil: consume it or store it. He shows that if 
price is above demand level at equilibrium than oil must be being stored, and that there can’t be a 
bubble if oil isn’t building inventories. He admits that there is a very low response rate of supply 
to price, which has been demonstrated to be as low as -.06. Using an example of a price 40% 
above equilibrium against this elasticity, Krugman shows that 2 million barrels would have to be 
being stored. He points out that this excess supply would have to be reported on inventory data 
and is not. Based on this, he concludes that there is no way an oil bubble could ever be present.  
 Whaley (2010) has conducted studies to test against the claim made by the U.S. Senate 
subcommittee that excessive speculation by commodity index investors has caused unwarranted 
increases in the price of wheat futures and has seriously impaired the contract’s effectiveness at 
being an effective risk management tool. Through multiple regression and statistical tests he was 
able to draw strong evidence against the claims made by the subcommittee. He concluded that 
commodity index investment should not be characterized as speculation, considering it is 
passive, fully-collateralized, long-only investment and an effective diversification tool for 
commodity index traders. His studies also showed that commodity index rolls have little futures 
price impact, and inflows and outflows from commodity index investment do not cause futures 
prices to change. The subcommittee report also concluded that commodity index investing is a 
major cause in the failure of the CBT’s wheat futures price to converge in the period 2006- 2009, 
with the futures price being particularly elevated in late 2008. Whaley argues that this 
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observation does not undermine the futures contract’s effectiveness. The absence of convergence 
to the cash price does not have any meaningful economic consequences, considering that almost 
futures contracts are vacated before reaching the delivery month. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMMODITY MARKETPLACE 
The commodity marketplace has become a vital component of the agriculture sector. 
Today’s agriculture would not be able to survive without it. This is due to the nature agricultural 
products. The time it takes to get commodities from production to final destination is what 
separates agriculture from other sectors. Also the initial investment required for agricultural 
production is large and is only going to increase. With prices of commodities historically being 
volatile, it can be difficult for producers to make such a daunting investment. This is where the 
commodity market serves its essential purpose. It allows those involved in agriculture to lock in 
their price, despite the constant up and down movement of commodity prices. This is 
accomplished through a process known as hedging. Producers can essentially pre sell their 
product by purchasing contracts on the futures market. The contract is set at a specific price and 
amount for a delivery period in the future. For every contract a producer enters into there must be 
a counter-party willing to accept the contract. Since final consumers of agricultural goods do not 
want to pre pay for their goods, financial institutions/speculators take the role of this counter-
party.   Typically, a large percentage of product is locked in to minimize risk, with the remaining 
being sold in the cash market for a spot price.  
One of the greatest qualities of commodity markets is that they allow for a standardized 
benchmark price and contract specifications to all market participants. The market is usually 
comprised of two contracts: the futures and the spot. The futures contract is a uniform price 
based off of all market information. This includes both public and private information. Public 
information, such as global supply and demand, is instantly reflected in the futures price. Private 
information will also be reflected in the futures price when acted upon by the holders of this 
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information, considering that transactions made by these players will allow the market to adjust 
to its true fundamental value. Futures contracts are an agreement between a buyer and a seller to 
exchange a good at a set price at some date in the future. It should be noted that an 
overwhelming majority of contracts are offset before the delivery period becomes to fruition. 
This exiting of a position is done by simply purchasing an opposite, equivalent contract of the 
same commodity. The other type of contract is a spot contract. This contract is simply an 
immediate exchange between the buyer and the seller on site. The spot price is derived from the 
futures price through an instrument known as the basis. The basis is simply the difference 
between the futures and spot price at a given time and location. The basis can have a large range 
of values across all locations. Some factors that affect basis levels are location, storage 
availability, storage costs, transportation costs, season, etc.  
 The tools mentioned above provided by the marketplace allow for one of the most key 
functions of the futures market. They allow producers to transfer away their risk to 
counterparties that can absorb this risk. These counterparties are typically investors and 
speculators. Their existence is critical to ensure proper functioning of the market as they provide 
liquidity to all participants. Producers purchase contracts in an attempt to lock in their final price 
received at delivery. This price received is the difference between the futures contract and the 
basis at the time of delivery. This means a producer can effectively transfer from a price risk to a 
basis risk, which is generally much less volatile and can be moderately estimated. Being able to 
easily offset a contract as maturity approaches is possible due to the liquidity. The process 
explained above is known as hedging and those involved in this process have connections to the 
actual physical commodity. Speculators and investors, on the other hand, do not deal with or are 
interested in the commodity at hand. They are willing to participate in the market in an attempt to 
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profit. This is accomplished by purchasing a contract and speculating on the movement of prices. 
If speculators/investors are correct, they can sell the contract for a higher value in the future.  
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CHAPTER 4 
HISTORY OF PRICE SHOCKS 
 One of the main events that caused for an investigation into the impact that speculative 
investment might have on commodities was the oil price crisis of 2007-2008. During this time oil 
rose and then plummeted at alarmingly rapid rates. To hypothesize that an influx of funds from 
speculative investors may have caused this, it may be beneficial to first look at previous oil 
shocks to understand their main causes.  
 We will look at 4 previous events that have occurred throughout history to identify both 
what caused them and their impact. The first oil shock occurred in 1973 due to the Yom Kippur 
War. The shock was a result of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) placing an embargo on the United States in response to the U.S. support of Israel 
(www.history.state.gov). This caused the price of oil to rise from $3/barrel up to $12/barrel. The 
second oil shock occurred in 1979 due to the Iranian revolution. This event caused a decrease in 
oil output, which subsequently caused the price of oil to double to $39+/barrel. Shortly after this 
period the Iran-Iraq war had arisen. This event caused oil production to completely stop in Iran 
to completely halt and also reduced Iraq’s production dramatically (Time 1979). This event 
caused oil prices to stay at an unsustainable level until the mid-1980s. A third oil shock occurred 
in 1990 in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. With uncertainty about the future of oil supply 
hanging, prices responded by rising from $17/barrel up to $36/barrel (Hamilton 2009). 
By reviewing these oil shocks throughout history, we can draw some commonalities 
between these events. All of these oil shocks could be concluded to have happened due to supply 
shortages/uncertainty due to geopolitical affairs. However, the case of the 2000’s oil crisis may 
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not be able to be explained by this. For this reason we need to further examine potential causes in 
order to understand the factors that ultimately contributed to this price shock.  
The 2000’s were met with their own unique set of geopolitical events such as the North 
Korean missile tests, Iranian nuclear plans, Hurricane Katrina, etc., which may lead some to 
point to these events as the cause for dramatic price jumps. These events did indeed have short 
term effects on prices, but were deemed insignificant in explaining the magnitude of price 
movements. Another explanation may be the stagnation of production despite a rising world 
demand. This was the case as Saudi Arabia, one of the major suppliers of oil, actually saw a 
reduction in their production during the period of 2005-2007. During this same period demand 
was rising, largely in part to China’s rapidly increase of oil consumption. Previous to this, 
increase in demand by China did not play as significant of a role in price impact due to their 
relatively small size in the market. But by the mid 2000’s China had developed into a significant 
consumer of oil and had become large enough to have meaningful impact on prices.  
Another factor that should be accounted for is the response to changes in the price of oil. 
The response by people to changes in oil price was not as large as it should have been. This may 
have been due to the relatively low allocation of income dedicated to energy and transportation. 
Since the fraction of budget allocated to this was relatively small, people could handle shifting 
their budget to allow for a larger fraction of energy and transportation to be expensed. This 
allowed people to continue to consume the convenient levels they were used to despite 
increasing prices. This shows that the price elasticity of demand for oil was initially low for 
people as dramatic price spikes occurred.  
 Masters (2008) proposed that the price shock of the 2000’s could be attributed to the 
large influx of speculative funds into the commodity markets. He argued that commodity index 
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funds were buying oil as a financial asset instead of the traditional buyer who is purchasing it for 
use. By the peak of oil prices, commodity index traders were holding a quarter trillion dollars’ 
worth of contracts. He argued that these fund managers were behaving this way in order to drive 
up the futures prices as well as the spot price connected to it. He referred to it as the 
financialization of “commodities”. His conclusion was that this financialization caused a 
speculative bubble in the oil price.  
 For the conclusion that commodity index funds are trying to artificially drive up prices to 
be true, one important factor must be present. That is that the price elasticity of demand must be 
very low. Since this actually was the case during this period, one could make the case that 
financial speculation truly was a decisive factor in the price of oil. Conveniently, the same factor 
that could potentially make this claim true, low price elasticity of demand, is also one of the 
main factors that helps explain a price shock due to simple fundamentals.  
 We can also examine the other factor mentioned above that supply was stagnating despite 
the fact demand was rising, and try to explain why this was the case. Those who are of the belief 
that speculation was the disruption causing the market to become inefficient could argue that the 
speculation itself was the reason why supply was not correctly altered to demand. Producers of 
oil could have been potentially misled by all of the speculative purchases. The high volume of 
long contracts being purchased may have signaled to producers of oil that they should halt their 
current production in order to potentially benefit from an increased price in the future. However, 
by looking at the futures contracts at the height of oil prices in July 2008, this theory can be 
disproved. It is true that futures contracts in the short future were higher than the spot price, but 
far out contracts were moving lower than the spot price. This suggests that producers should not 
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have based their production on futures alone, and thus speculation driving futures prices may not 
have been a determining factor in the price shock (Hamilton 2009). 
The two factors outline previously; a failure to keep supply constant with demand and a 
low price elasticity of demand, are two major factors that would be necessary for prices to move 
far away from their actual values. These fundamental factors could be enough in explaining the 
sudden price spike of 2007-2008, as demonstrated above. However, considering the speed and 
magnitude of the subsequent price collapse, one may hypothesize that there was indeed a 
speculative price bubble which caused prices to rise dramatically (Hamilton 2009). 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA AND METHODS 
The research procedures for this time series analysis required data to be collected for both 
positions held by speculative investors and commodity prices. The data for speculative positions 
was collected from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The CFTC releases a 
weekly report, known as the Commitment of Traders (COT). This report provides a breakdown 
of each Tuesday’s open interest for markets in which 20 or more traders hold positions equal to 
or above the reporting levels established by the CFTC. This report separates traders into four 
different classes, which is illustrated in TABLE 2 below. (www.cftc.gov) In this study we will be 
using the managed money accounts to represent speculation. The net position refers to the 
difference between the open long and short contracts. The data for commodity prices was 
collected from the Quandl database. This database has historical prices of almost all tradable 
commodities. For the sake of this study, we will be using the historical prices concurrent with the 
COT reports. The data being used ranges from 6/30/2006 - 12/30/2014. This range is used due to 
the COT report only having data back to 6/13/2006, and the Quandl database only reporting 
prices up to the end of 2014. This was done in an attempt to keep the data uniform. The 
commodities being studied are NYMEX Crude Oil (Energy), CBOT Corn (Agricultural), and 
CBOT SRW (Agricultural). 
The preliminary models used for this study can be expressed as: 
(1a) Nearby Commodity Price = β0 + β1(Managed Money Net Position) +εi 
(1b)  ΔNearby Commodity Price = β0 + β1(Δ Managed Money Net Position) +εi 
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Using the equation (1a) we can test to see if there is a significant relationship between 
nearby commodity prices and the managed money net positions. Equation (1b) tests for the same 
relationship, but instead as a percentage change. These equations will be used to test each of the 
different commodities. The expected sign of the coefficient for both of these equations is 
positive, meaning that an increase in the net position of managed money accounts will show an 
increase in price. This is to be expected the case for all three of the commodities in the study.  
Next the data will be tested with the incorporation of a time lag. In the first case, 
managed money net positions will be the lagged variable (causal) and prices will be the response 
variable. The models used to test this can be expressed as: 
(2a) Nearby Commodity Price = β0 + β1(Nearby Commodity Price)t-1 +β2 (Managed Money Net Position)t-1 +εi 
(2b) ΔNearby Commodity Price = β0 + β1(ΔNearby Commodity Price)t-1 +β2 (ΔManaged Money Net Position)t-1 
+εi 
 These models can be used to indicate whether past values of managed money net 
positions are reliable in predicting values of price. Model (2a) measures the actual change for 
both variables. Model (2b) is being used to capture the magnitude of change, which may be 
lost when measuring actual change. In the case for both equations the expected sign of the 
coefficient is to be positive, indicating that prices will move (respond) in the same direction 
that the managed money accounts are moving. This assumption holds true for all of the 
commodities.  
 Finally, models will be constructed to test the effects of lagged prices on current levels of 
speculative investment. It can be hypothesized that as prices move in a certain direction, 
investors will follow the trend. To test this hypothesis, the following models will be used: 
(3a) Managed Money Net Position = β0 + β1(Managed Money Net Position)t-1 +β2 (Nearby Commodity Price)t-1 
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+εi 
(3b) ΔManaged Money Net Position = β0 + β1(ΔManaged Money Net Position)t-1 +β2 (ΔNearby Commodity Price)t-
1 +εi 
 These models can be used to indicate whether past values of commodity prices can be 
used to predict future levels of investment. Like the above, the first model (3a) measures the 
actual change of the variables. The second model (3b) measures percent change from each 
observation, to capture the magnitude of change. Considering strategies used by investment 
funds, such as trend following, model (3b) may be the most appropriate in testing this 
hypothesis. Nonetheless, both models will be used for interpretation. The expected sign of the 
coefficient for both models is positive, indicating that investors will follow the changes in price.  
 The hypothesis test for all models is consistent. Several hypothesis tests will be done in 
this study. A t-test will be done for each independent variable to see whether the estimated beta 
coefficient is statistically different from zero. Rejection of a null hypothesis will indicate that the 
estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero. Failure to reject a null hypothesis will 
mean that the estimated coefficient is statistically no different than zero and therefore will have 
no significant impact on the dependent variable. The hypothesis tests can be summarized in 
Table 1 below.  
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Table 1: Hypothesis Test 
1. H0: Managed Money Net Position = 0 
2. H0: ΔManaged Money Net Position = 0 
3. H0: Managed Money Net Position = 0 
4. H0: ΔManaged Money Net Position = 0 
5. H0: Nearby Commodity Price = 0 
6. H0: ΔNearby Commodity Price = 0 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
The results of the regression analysis are reported in the table below. For all commodities 
there are significant t-values for the simple regression model (1a). As expected the sign of the 
coefficient in these tests is positive. This regression model has managed money net position as 
the independent variable and nearby commodity price as the dependent variable. For crude oil 
the estimated coefficient is .0000012796, meaning for every 1 contract increase in managed 
money net position there will be an expected .0000012796 increase in nearby crude oil price. For 
corn the estimated coefficient is .0000754113, meaning for every 1 contract increase there will 
be an expected .0000754112 increase in nearby corn price. For wheat the estimated coefficient is 
.000188348, meaning for every 1 contract increase there will be an expected .000188348 
increase in nearby wheat price. The regression models that incorporated time lag all produced 
similar results. None of the commodities tested were able to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient explaining change was significantly different from zero. These results are 
summarized in Table 4. It should be noted in the model using lagged values of change in net 
position of corn to predict change in corn price, a t-value of 1.78 was produced. Although this 
value is not high enough to reject the null hypothesis at α =0.05, it does come very close.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study are fairly consistent with those who have done prior research. 
There is little evidence to show that speculative investments have any measurable impact in 
causing price movement. The tests show that there is a significant correlation between prices and 
speculative investments, but correlation does not imply causation. Through the use of Granger 
causality tests, it was determined that speculation does not granger cause price movements, and 
price movements do not granger cause speculative investment. As others have concluded, 
speculation may have the potential to move prices in short horizons, known as bubbles. 
However, when given time the market will always correct itself so that prices reflect their true 
fundamental values.  
These results show that there is currently not a need to try and control speculation in the 
marketplace. The proposed position limits do not hold merit. By trying to control speculation 
without evidence showing that it may be disruptive could be very problematic to the 
marketplace. An inefficiently operating market may become the subsequent result of 
implementing such a change. The accounts held by these investors give necessary liquidity to the 
market. Without them, producers and other users of the physical commodity may have to inherit 
risk that they might not be able to handle.  
The main limitation of this study is the assumption that has to be made about the 
Commitment of Traders report. The report does the best job it can at classifying the different 
types of traders. However, some market participants may be able to report in categories other 
than what their intended purpose of trading is. For example, some large firms that handle the 
actual physical commodity may also take speculative positions that do not reflect their actual 
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business operation. This is even acknowledged by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
Going forward, researchers may have to find a way to work around this limitation. This may be 
done through the acquisition of data from other sources that may have information on large 
investment firms.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 2: Categories and Description of Trading Classes in CFTC COT Report 
Producer/ 
Merchant/ 
Processor/ User 
 
Entities that predominantly engage in the production, processing, packing or handling 
of a physical commodity and uses the futures markets to manage or hedge risks 
associated with those activities. 
 
Swap Dealer 
 
Entities that deal primarily Over-The-Counter in swaps for a commodity and uses the 
futures markets to manage or hedge the risk associated with those swaps transactions.  
Money 
Manager 
Entities which manage on-exchange futures trading on behalf of their clients. Names 
of such money managers range from Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs), 
registered Commodity Pool Advisors (CPOs), as well as unregistered funds, many 
Hedge Funds and large Exchange Traded Funds 
Other 
Reportables 
Every other reportable trader that is not placed into one of the other three categories  
Non-reporting 
Traders 
Smaller traders who are not obliged to report their positions 
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Table 3: Explanation of Variables 
Variable Explanation 
OILP Nearby NYMEX Crude Oil price 
CORNP Nearby CBOT Corn price 
WHEATP Nearby CBOT Wheat price 
OILPCTP 
Percentage change of price from weekly observation for 
NYMEX Crude Oil  
CORNPCTP 
Percentage change of price from weekly observation for 
CBOT Corn  
WHEATPCTP 
Percentage change of price from weekly observation for 
CBOT Wheat  
OILMMN Managed Money net position for NYMEX Crude Oil 
CORNMMN Managed Money net position for CBOT Corn 
WHEATMMN Managed Money net position for CBOT Wheat 
OILPCTMMN 
Percentage change of Managed Money net position 
from weekly observation for NYMEX Crude Oil 
CORNPCTMMN 
Percentage change of Managed Money net position 
from weekly observation for CBOT Corn 
WHEATPCTMM
N 
Percentage change of Managed Money net position 
from weekly observation for CBOT Wheat 
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Table 4: Results of Regression 
Dependent Independent Estimated Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
OILP OILMMN .127965E-5 14.64** [0.000] 
CORNP CORNMMN .754113E-4 14.02** [0.000] 
WHEATP WHEATMMN .188348E-3 10.36** [0.000] 
OILPCTP OILCPTMMN .638014E-2 3.62** [0.000] 
CORNPCTP CORNPCTMMN .504633E-2 1.79* [0.074] 
WHEATPCTP WHEATPCTMMN .201276E-3 0.59 [0.555] 
OILP OILMMN(-1) .289375E-5 1.17 [0.242] 
CORNP CORNMMN(-1) .211133E-4 1.78* [0.075] 
WHEATP WHEATMMN(-1) .481429E-4 1 [0.318] 
OILMMN OILP(-1) -65.1683 0.14 [0.891] 
CORNMMN CORNP(-1) -8.48635 -0.91 [0.363] 
WHEATMMN WHEATP(-1) -1.28825 -0.36 [0.719] 
OILPCTP OILPCTMMN(-1) .171569E-2 0.04 [0.344] 
CORNPCTP CORNPCTMMN(-1) .261428E-2 0.92 [0.356] 
WHEATPCTP WHEATPCTMMN(-1) .472632E-3 1.39 [0.163] 
OILPCTMMN OILPCTP(-1) .375144E-2 0.29 [0.77] 
CORNPCTMMN CORNPCTP(-1) 1.21772 1.54 0[.123] 
WHEATPCTMMN WHEATPCTP(-1) -6.95274 -1.04 [0.297] 
T-values with ** denotes a significant value and values with * denote a level close to significant. P-values that are 
bold reject the null hypothesis at α =0.05. P=Price. MMN=Managed Money Net. PCT=% Change 
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Figure 1: NYMEX Crude Oil Managed Money Net Position and Nearby Price 
 
 
Figure 2: CBOT Corn Managed Money Net Position and Nearby Pric 
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Figure 3: CBOT Wheat Managed Money Net Position and Nearby Price 
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